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‘There’s no such thing as 
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Summary  In 1999 Ixer published a critical article ‘There is no Such Thing as 
Reflection’ (1999), which attempted to halt the unquestioning acceptance of the 
concept of reflection from academics and professionals. Social work students 
are required to demonstrate their ability to reflect in practice yet reflection is ill 
defined therefore, problematic to assess. Ixer challenged the academic community 
to research this area more extensively so we can know more about the very thing 
we are assessing in students; in essence, ensure that our assessment is ethical. The 
article takes stock on what we have learnt about reflection over the past ten years 
and how such understanding is informing more ethical assessment of students.
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Introduction of the problem
Ove 10 Years ago Ixer (1999) published an article called ‘There’s no such 
thing as Refl ection,’ which attempted to act as a catalyst to the bourgeoning 
debate on refl ective practice. Since the 1980s and the key publication 
of Schön’s landmark publication on refl ection (1983) a new rhetoric 
has emerged. Professions in Nursing, teaching and social work (Bok, 
1984; Calderhead ,1989; Crandall, 1993) began viewing the concept of 
refl ection as something important in developing professional capability 
and continues to do so today (White et al, 2006)). Refl ection became 
a requirement for all social work courses (CCETSW 1989). However, 
in trying to assess refl ection at qualifying level, Ixer (1999) struggled 
to understand it as there was no clear defi nition of what was refl ection 
and the more one looked into the concept the more complicated it 
became. Consequently, the 1999 article explored the theoretical nature 
of refl ection. It concluded with a number of paradigms that underpin 
refl ection but purports this to be problematic and a contested area of 
knowledge. How we refl ect and think about refl ection is a continuous 
challenge which goes back as far as Socrates (in Plato 1924), through to 
Kant’s concept of practical reasoning (Meredith 1964), Dewey’s (1910) 
underpinning link to the social world and Habermas’ (1984) critical 
dialogue. The main challenge is the need for substantial research to 
identify what refl ective practice is and that until such time this is known 
we have to assume there is no such thing as refl ection. This is because 
the knowledge available is contested, insuffi cient and incoherent as 
other writers concur (Burns and Bulman 2000:20 and Russell, 2005).
Whether refl ection is a thing in itself (Cliff et al 1990) or something 
waiting to be socially constructed (Fook 2010), is all part of a debate 
that the research community needs a continual engagement. However, 
refl ection has achieved professional prominence (Moon 2004). Ten 
years on seems a good time to take stock and see what has changed, if 
anything in our understanding of what is refl ection?
‘There’s no such thing as refl ection: Ten years on’
77 J. of Practice Teaching & Learning 10(1) 2010, pp.75-93. DOI: 10.1921/ 146066910X570285. © w&b
Methodology
Because the specifi c challenge of this paper is directed towards the 
social work community the literature review is generally, although 
not entirely limited to UK social work publications. In doing this it is 
acknowledged that other substantial developments may have happened 
in other professions however, the task is specifi cally on how the social 
work profession accepts the challenge for more research. A literature 
search was undertaken in 2009 using Social Care Online. Using the 
search term ‘Refl ection’ revealed 420 relevant references. Using a search 
term of ‘refl ective practice’ revealed 335 references although some 
were duplicates. Lastly a search using the term ‘refl exivity’ revealed 
98 references. Of the 853 abstracts reviewed they were further refi ned 
down to 38 key references which were analysed in depth. The analysis 
separated research that more specifi cally focussed on the deconstruction 
of meaning of refl ection or where themes emerged that looked beyond 
the application of refl ection.
Because only one database was used a physical search of major social 
work journals were also undertaken at the University of Bedfordshire to 
ensure key articles were not missed. To support the knowledge review 
small group exercises took place with a number of undergraduate 
second year students on the social work degree at Winchester University 
in the South of England. Closed questions were used on student levels 
of confi dence, understanding of refl ection and the measurement being 
used to assess refl ective practice were asked. Although this empirical 
activity may not be representative, does provide indicative evidence to 
support the main hypothesis being argued in this article.
Key characteristics of refl ection
In the 1999 article (Ixer 1999) one of the conclusions looked at 
Habermas (1974) as critical in bring a number of paradigms together 
– ‘the critical, the refl ective and the hermeneutic’ into what might 
be seen as an emancipatory and a holistic theory of enlightenment’ 
(White 1997). However, as explained earlier it is for the social work 
community to defi ne for itself its own understanding of refl ection and 
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not for other theorists like Habarmas to develop new theories on their 
behalf. The concluding challenge was brought into stark focus when 
Ixer challenged (2000b) that refl ection should not be assessed until we 
know more about what it is. Cervero (1992) went one step further and 
talked about refl ection as a political ideology that serves nothing more 
than to legitimate pedagogy in practice to elevate and accord with equal 
status which we now know as ‘work base learning.’ The following will 
identify key characteristics.
From his 1999 article Ixer extended the debate by undertaking 
empirical research with social work students, employers and practice 
teachers and reported his fi ndings (2000a, 2000b) to support a developing 
body of knowledge that refl ection has defi ned characteristics. Such a 
claim was not new as Korthagen and Wubbels study reveals (1995 and 
1996). Their fi rst paradigm is refl ection in action underpinned by the 
pragmatists of Mead and Dewey (Ixer 2000b: 21). The second is refl ection 
as a social process underpinned by the enlightenment theorist Kant and 
more recently Kemmis (1985:21). Thirdly the paradigm of refl ection as 
dialogue was expressed by Habarmas (1992) and Freire (1985). These 
paradigms were further defi ned in Ixer( 2003). The cognitive process 
of refl ection in action is supported by Schön (1983) although dismissed 
by Eraut (1994) and replaced by his new meta-cognitive approach (e.g. 
thinking about one’s thinking) which gives an example of how theorists 
were beginning a new discourse on refl ection.
A key characteristic was how values infl uence the refl ective process, 
whatever the refl ective process is. Writers such as Issitt coined a new 
phrase ‘anti-oppressive refl ective practice (1999) and saw the integration 
of values as crucial to the process of refl ecting in practice. Fook 
(2004: 85) took this one step further in claiming a ‘refl exive stance in 
intercultural social work that can open the way for us to understand a 
lot more about what is central in social work.’ Further Fook and others 
challenged the dominant culture of passivity in thinking and talked 
about the preparation people need because of the risks they take when 
challenging the status quo (Fook & Askeland 2007). Others linked the 
importance of values to refl ection (Gardiner (2009). However, despite 
the vast literature on values in social work little if anything is published 
linking refl ection and social work values (Issit 1999).
Ixer developed four domains of refl ective reasoning supported by 
empirical research: cognitive, affective, social and values. A number 
of theorists and academics began to write about refl ection and new 
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themes emerged that identifi ed emotion as a key characteristic. This 
was mainly attributed to the work of David Boud and his colleagues 
(1985). Others such as Banks in her work on ethics in social work (1995) 
were being used to support the notion that values are purely a human 
process. Aristotle ‘in his virtuous being’ (1850) presented refl ection as 
intrinsically central to human nature. If one is to believe both these 
claims one can deduce values are intrinsically part of the refl ective 
process because it is intrinsically part of human nature.
The cognitive domain examines a meta-cognitive process of thinking 
about one’s thinking as presented by Eraut (1994). The affective domain 
is identifi ed in how we interact with our thinking processes and our 
emotional capabilities. Social workers can easily identify with this 
domain by referring to the psychological theorists that dominate the 
social work discipline although probably not thought about in relation 
to refl ection. The third domain is social, which is much more external 
facing. How is our thinking infl uenced by those things in the world 
that infl uence us? This is about our social interaction with the world 
which takes account of our social identity and our social construction 
of the world. More important is the element of control and political 
ideology that affect what we know and infl uence a given legitimacy 
and power to socially construct the world. Lastly the domain of values 
represents our belief systems and cultural histories. This fourth domain 
could be argued as being part of what Fook cites as ‘critical social work’ 
(2003). The social domain is values as political social ideologies. The 
postmodern revolution attempted to develop a level of independent 
thinking that challenged the status quo (Barnett 1997). It helped to 
bring together the polemic of performivity culture from Lyotard (1984) 
which searched for instrumental and technical reasoning and the 
emancipatory forces of Habarmas’s ‘communicative dialogic reason 
(1992). In other words – to develop a more collaborative approach which 
can be best presented as the best argument to achieve moral action.
These domains represent an integration of key characteristics that 
helps us take the project of refl ection forward. However they have 
been deduced from existing theory loosely linked to limited empirical 
evidence with roots in mixed disciplines from psychology, philosophy, 
political science, anthropology and theology.
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Emerging themes
During the past ten years very little research has been published on 
refl ective practice in social work that attempts to defi ne what it is, 
although there is evidence of a signifi cant debate. The following refl ects 
themes from some of these debates.
Refl ection as a meta-cognitive process
Maria Dempsey and colleagues (2001) present interesting work in trying 
to defi ne refl ection. Their framework identifi es a supporting framework 
which refers to ‘scaffolding the process’. They see refl ection as part of 
a constructivist phenomenological approach to learning based on the 
work of Schön (1983 and 1987) and Dewey (1933). This fi ts well with 
Ixer’s social domain and to some extent with the cognitive domain 
because of the way both Dewey and Schön see refl ection as dependent 
on problematic knowledge, that is a problem that is causing perplexity 
fi rst identifi ed by Dewey (1910). The key to their work is they recognise 
students cannot just learn how to refl ect unless they are given dedicated 
time to learn the craft of refl ection. In this context it refers not just to 
thinking, everyone can contemplate or even refl ect without too much 
diffi culty. This means what Eraut and others refer to as meta-cognition 
(1994) think about their thinking in a short space of time in the context 
of professional action. This process is seen as the ‘practicum’ (Dempsey 
2001:634) which is in between the esoteric world of the academy and 
the risks of real social work practice; a virtual world of real learning. 
Consequently effective refl ection seems to link with the speed of an 
individual’s thinking to action in practice.
In Dempsey’s (2001, p.637) article he refers to the importance of 
‘affective and cognitive’ processes in the way an individual explores 
inwardly about themselves which supports the earlier work of Ixer. He 
concludes with criticism that both the college and practice environments 
fail students to construct meaningful frameworks to help them learn 
how to refl ect and obtain the deeper level feedback that Kolb (1984) 
and others cite as essential in an effective learning cycle. The affective 
characteristic of refl ection is something supported else where (Ruch 
2009).
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In other work Kam-shing Yip (2006) supports the notion of 
preparing students to refl ect as an essential part of the curriculum. 
More importantly Yip identifi es the risks in damaging one’s self and 
their professional identity. Social workers operate in demanding 
environments with high levels of unpredictability. The psychological 
damage caused by suppressing feelings of failure because such social 
work cases do not achieve the desired outcomes expected, and with 
no opportunity for the social worker to refl ect with their supervisor, 
compounds their feelings of helplessness. Yip concludes with a strong 
affi rmation that refl ection is a social process that requires research in 
how the different social conditions affect the process of refl ective social 
work practice in action.
In a further signifi cant contribution Ruch (2002) contextualises 
the vast interest and developments in refl ective practice as part of a 
technical-rational response to a growing recognition of complexity in 
the world of social work. However, refl ection fi nds a home with the 
post modern thinkers who argue for a refl ective and holistic approach 
to learning (Gould and Taylor 1996, Gould 2000, Howe 1998, Lishman 
1998, Martyn 2000, Powell 1996 found in Ruch et all 2002:200). Their 
work relates to the social and affective domains developed by Ixer. Ruch 
puts importance on the social and affective perspectives as key to the 
process of refl ection. The issues of transference and counter transference 
in relationships are important psychological interactions that create 
dependencies and effect the way we think. Learners operate in a human 
context and have to manage these feelings as part of everyday practice. 
The key aspect of effective refl ection is the capacity and ability to bring 
together the ‘rational and irrational aspects of human functioning’ (Ruch 
2002:203), in particular how we use our imagination in refl ection to 
‘think out of the box’ (Osmond and Darlington 2005).
It is diffi cult to conceptualise categories with levels, albeit levels of 
refl ection as something that in this author’s own research is important 
if one is to reach the meta-cognitive level argued by Eraut (1994). Ruch 
and colleagues present a triangle where the practitioner, researcher 
and educator are placed at each point in constant interaction. The 
key to achieving refl ection is in how well one supports learners in the 
beginning stage of uncertainty and doubt and allows for an element 
of tolerance in the learner’s unknowing. This appears essential to the 
construction of any theory of refl ection.
Despite these signifi cant contributions to knowledge on refl ection 
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they fail to develop a new theory although help to deconstruct key 
elements involved in refl ection. The messy thinking that learners have to 
live with is all part of their journey of discovery and clarity. The problem 
as exposed by Ruch (2002), Yip (2006) and Dempsey et al (2001) is that 
educators are ill informed to understand the meta-cognitive processes 
of refl ection. They need to allow space and time for uncertainty and 
‘messy’ thinking to take place to enable a more deliberative and refl ective 
process to develop to create the certainty required.
Refl ection as a challenge to uncertainty
D’Cruz and her colleagues (2007) took a step further. They undertook 
a major literature review on the concept of refl exivity and its meaning 
to critical refl ective social work practice. In their substantial review 
they rightly highlight the blurring of boundaries between the concept 
of refl exivity and refl ection and its interchangeable use. They identify a 
number of sources that use these terms interchangeably whilst also those 
who differentiate them. It is because of this lack of clear boundaries 
that has contributed to the lack of clarity and failure in developing a 
new theory. They describe the various meanings of refl exivity into three 
variations of the same theme.
The fi rst variation describes this as an individual’s response to their 
situation. This focus is on how an individual is able to master the forces 
that affect their practice by applying refl exivity ‘as a skill to process 
information and enhance decision making’ (D’Cruz et al, 2007: 77). 
The second variation is defi ned as a critical approach to professional 
practice that challenges the underlining assumptions and beliefs of the 
individual especially relationships of power. This variation emphasises 
the social constructionist nature of knowledge and further identifi es 
‘their personal narratives’. This helps to develop meaning and practice 
wisdom for the individual. The fi nal and third theme is based on a 
critical awareness of factors that infl uence knowledge creation. This is 
those infl uences that are part of the social construction of an individual’s 
meaning of the world. This variation involves emotions and the concepts 
of empathy and non-judgemental practice as key attributes to refl ective 
practice. The research claims this is different from contemporary 
thinking as one needs to separate emotions to maintain control and 
objectivity in the thought processes. The emphasis here is placed on 
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the importance of ‘controlled emotional involvement’. In this sense 
refl exivity becomes a skill for clients to learn. Uncertainty is a theme 
running through all three variations and links to similar aspects of the 
environment to which refl ection operates (Ruch, 2002). In conclusion 
they identify refl exivity as an individual process infl uenced by the social 
construction of the world and how we relate to it on an emotional level.
They separate the meaning of refl ection and refl exivity by claiming 
that refl ection is a critical way of exposing the inconsistencies inherent 
in knowledge creation often developed from positivistic and deductive 
paradigms. They claim that refl ection denies practice wisdom in 
favour of formal knowledge whereas critical refl ection values practice 
wisdom and cites the work of Fook and others as their main source of 
evidence. However, this can be challenged as Moffi tt et al (2005) shows 
who tried to develop a refl exive model but found the research process 
problematic. They conclude that despite the debate on refl ection we 
are still no further on in understanding what it is. They argue for an 
enlightenment model – ‘refl ection is not an end point but to ‘unveil 
the many possibilities of knowledge’ (Moffatt et al, 2005: 101). In some 
sense we should not be too concerned about the problematic nature of 
researching refl ection as Boud claims (2009). Refl ection is not a strategy 
or technique but a way of thinking about ‘productive work’ (2009:36).
This links to the work of Sheppard and colleagues (2000) who 
looked at refl exivity and the development of process knowledge. They 
started from a position from looking at refl exivity as a way of exploring 
process knowledge. Their research created concept categories of process 
knowledge which provide further evidence of the need for a high level 
cognitive ability to guide our actions more effectively in practice. To a 
more limited extent Fisher et al (2000) relates refl exivity to developing 
student ability in utilising their theoretical capability as a construct for 
action in practice. Although these contributions are useful they do not 
answer the fundamental question what is refl ection?
Refl ection as a social construction
One of the most signifi cant contributions to the refl ective practice debate 
is the emerging work of Jan Fook, especially her theoretical framework 
for critical refl ection (2007) and further reworked later (2010). It could 
be argued that Fook’s work is only a reconstruction of what has already 
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been said by others on critical refl ection (Brookfi eld (1995) and Mezirow 
(2000)), or characterises the same paradigms underpinning refl ective 
practice (Ixer 2000b). However, the unique contribution Fook makes 
to the debate locates contemporary understanding of critical practice 
in a theoretical framework that begins developing the basis of a new 
theory of refl ection.
What is the framework? There are four main theoretical constructs 
that Fook identifi es – refl exivity, post modernism, de-constructionism 
and critical social theory. This proposition is tempered with the normal 
caveats used by anyone researching refl ection – it is a diffi cult subject to 
research. However her clear approach helps to contextualise a distinct 
discourse for critical refl ection. The fi rst area is the refl ective approach 
to theory and practice. In essence this means experiencing the confl ict 
that often exists that on the one hand there are high levels or espoused 
theories to on the other hand, the reality of practice, which serves only 
to widen the gap between them. Theory then becomes redundant as 
easy solutions are problematic.
The crucial aspect of her framework is refl exivity, which could be 
seen in itself as a form of critical refl ection. It is a form of turning back 
on oneself to see what is within but also outwardly facing as a form 
of social interaction. Refl ective practitioners become researchers of 
their own practice and create practice theory – because they unsettle 
their earlier assumptions (Fook 2007:16). Individuals begin to identify 
that everything about them, their knowledge, values, emotions and 
social context, infl uence the way they research social assumptions. 
Consequently new knowledge is creative as ‘evidenced, social, reactive 
and interactional.’
The second area is postmodernism. Fook’s (2007: 31) interpretation 
of postmodernism is simply challenging of ‘linear thinking’. In this 
she asserts knowledge is created in a progressive way, a new theory 
overtakes another to accumulate better knowledge in search of truth. 
Postmodernist thinking identifi es the relationship power has with 
knowledge and enables one to challenge the dominant discourse. 
Through this we deconstruct a new way of thinking. Postmodernism 
and post structuralism is a focus on knowledge and power where 
through language we deconstruct our thinking which leads to the third 
area of de-construction. Knowledge becomes a social construction 
but our challenge opens up ways of contradicting linear and unifi ed 
knowledge.
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The fourth part of the framework is critical social theory. This 
recognises how power is personally experienced and structurally 
created. Individuals contribute to their own domination by maintaining 
certain beliefs about themselves. Change takes place on a personal and 
collective basis. Any change at an individual level involves change on 
a broader social level. There is a realisation of the interplay between 
the personal and social to form an empirical reality. Finally Fook 
emphasises the importance that communication and dialogue plays 
in creating different meanings as they make our understanding more 
dynamic as part of the interaction between the personal and social 
worlds. In essence critical social theory provides a helpful framework 
for deconstructing an alternative way of understanding ourselves.
In Fook’s theoretical framework she provides a model of critical 
refl ection and gives examples of how this can be implemented in 
practice. As a result of students being taken through this process, Fook 
identifi es key student outcomes - understanding theory, tolerating 
uncertainty, gaining self awareness of personal behaviours and 
enhancing their inclusive emancipatory practice and enhanced sense 
of professionalism.
Whilst the evidence supports the theoretical construct of refl ection 
presented by Fook it clearly links to key characteristics. Ixer identifi ed 
how uncertain these theoretical constructs are and in their dependency 
with each other. The refl exivity fi rst phase allows someone to look back 
at themselves challenging certain held assumptions whilst creating 
space for uncertainty. How much uncertainty does one need to progress 
to the next two phases where we can begin to deconstruct our thinking? 
How dependent is one phase on another? Fook’s framework describes a 
‘reasoning environment’ conducive to refl ective thinking as it challenges 
assumptions causing uncertainty so reconstructing understanding can 
take place. However evidence does support the four characteristics of 
cognition, affective, social and values that all play a key role in Fook’s 
‘reasoning environment’ but how much they infl uence or are co-
dependent on each other is unclear. Evidence suggest they exist but they 
are not identifi ed as part of Fook’s theoretical constructs, which shows 
how much more complex refl ection is in deconstructing its meaning.
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Refl ection means different things to different people
All the authors included in this paper argue that the defi nitions and 
interchangeable terms mean different things to different people which 
takes us no further than ten years ago. Holding different understandings 
can lead to confusion about what is refl ection and its usefulness. There 
is evidence of the positive nature of refl ection, although not in social 
work but physiotherapy (Wessell and Larin (2006)). Their research 
looked at a group of physiotherapy students over two time periods 
or reporting. They compared student’s outcomes of refl ection in the 
fi rst period against the last period and found that there was a higher 
level of refl ectivity in the last period. Their measurement was based 
on coding refl ective narrative that students used in their journal after 
events occurred in practice. Although it does not defi ne what is being 
measured they conclude that students rated at the highest level of 
refl ection had a greater level of confi dence and focus on their ‘client’ in 
their third placement.
From all of these studies cited in this paper it appears that the link to 
effective social work practice is more successful in the ‘wise reasoning’ 
capability of the individual than the development of formal knowledge 
attainment, which is one of the main drivers in higher education. This 
is acutely emphasised by Taylor and White (2006). Social workers 
are under pressure to reduce uncertainty; a phenomenon of social 
work practice, by equipping themselves with greater propositional 
knowledge, yet this only leads to formulaic based practice; a template 
for action. Social work must stay with ‘uncertainty’ and develop the 
individual’s skills of ‘wise judgement’ to give them the confi dence to 
‘interrogate and case reasoning’ (Taylor and White, 2006: 937) or what 
others might call critical refl ection. By doing this they will be more 
likely to defend external challenge of their judgements.
Analysis
In 10 years one could say with confi dence that there is no grand theory 
of refl ection. The article published by Ixer ten years ago created an 
interest where academics and professionals began to debate and publish 
more widely. Developing models of how to train and educate students 
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in refl ection and refl exivity is one of the main outcomes of the past ten 
years. Students at one university for example, are taught refl ection as 
part of a shadowing placement experience and then required to write 
refl ective articles on their experience.
Empirical evidence
In group interviews with students (49) 100% were confi dent in their 
understanding of what is refl ection, although only 87.5% was confi dent 
in refl ecting. However in follow up questions there was less confi dence. 
In asking whether the student’s practice teacher/assessor described 
explicitly their model or understanding of refl ection to which they were 
being assessed, 100% said no. In following this up they were asked if 
they understood what was being assessed, e.g. model or understanding 
of refl ection, which Ixer (2000b) argued as essential ethical assessment? 
All of the students (100%) said ‘no’ that they did not understand what 
was being assessed. Also when asked if they could describe their 
own theory or model of refl ection again 100% answered ‘no’. This 
seems to contradict with their espoused understanding of refl ection. 
This concern is something others are now beginning to acknowledge 
(Clonder 2009 and Edwards and Cunningham 2009) If we are unable to 
describe the theory of refl ection or understand how it is understood in 
practice then can we still remain confi dent that there is such a thing as 
refl ection? Clearly, whatever refl ection is we will get no nearer knowing 
this without greater sustained and systematic research.
Is refl ection an ethical process?
During the past 10 years we have not achieved a theory of refl ection and 
the evidence presented here has shown that it is used interchangeably for 
many reasons and purposes because the boundaries of what refl ection 
is are blurred (Moffi tt et al 2005). Therefore if we cannot defi ne it can 
we assess it in social work education? This is something Dalley (2009: 
20) claims and Ghaye (2007) also expresses concerns about its ethical 
value in assessment. Further, is it ethical to assess refl ection when the 
assessment methodology is fl awed because the espouse theory assessors 
use is predominantly esoteric, tacit and intuitive, rather than socially 
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knowable and clearly explained? Fook (2009) describes a number of 
processes that students experience to help them tolerate uncertainty 
whilst developing knowledge, gaining self-awareness of personal 
behaviours and enhancing their sense of professionalism. These could 
be described as the outputs of a refl ective process that could lend itself 
to an ethical assessment process, if used.
Refl ection is a known unknowable
From the early literature that describes practice models of refl ection 
Fook has taught us to be more sophisticated by linking the refl ection 
agenda to existing grand theories such as social theory and social 
constructionism. Ixer and others have identifi ed key characteristics 
of the refl ective process that can be defi ned as domains of cognitive, 
social, affective and values. Much of the literature has supported this in 
whole or part. However, the evidence thus far fails to demonstrate any 
robust reliability test for what is refl ection? For example, if a student in 
their refl ective thought about a problem, can only utilise the domains 
of values and cognition would this still be refl ection or is refl ection 
something that must include all domains? Alternatively if as Fook 
purports a student is able to unearth individually held assumptions in 
order to make changes in the social world by living with uncertainty 
which may or may not involve such refl ective domains in part or whole, 
would this be suffi cient as a refl ective outcome? If it is refl ection how 
would we know? Such questions have never been answered as our 
enquiry into refl ection has been piece meal or reviewed with a number of 
foci in mind. Social work education needs a sustained research approach 
to test a number of assumptions being held about refl ection. The key 
assumption is refl ection exists but just needs to be found.
Yet in an alternative cultural and epistemological context the work 
of Humphrey (2009) is illuminating. The problem with thinking 
about what is refl ection is constrained by the way western ideology is 
culturally and historically shaped. Viewing more eastern philosophies 
and traditions will fi nd more acceptable solutions to the question of 
what is refl ection. The Buddhist maxim ‘it is our minds that create this 
world’ (Humphrey, 2009: 380) suggest that refl ection is not a thing in 
itself but only something created by our mind. If this is so then perhaps 
we should not worry so much about fi nding it as it can only exist in 
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our own minds which makes it more diffi cult to expose to external 
assessment.
It is reasonable to conclude from the evidence that refl ection is 
not a purely cognitive process because of its relationship with other 
important domains such as – social beliefs and emotions. These 
human interactive qualities cannot be separated therefore the process 
of refl ection must be deductive. Our deductive reasoning includes four 
key characteristics that can be described as cognitive, social, affective 
and values which interact with each other depending on the context, 
the individual and the task. In essence we have identifi ed a process of 
unknowing and uncertainty where refl ection takes place to allow the 
practitioner to remain in the ‘messy lowlands’ of practice (Schön 1983) 
as the reasoning required to transcend this can only be found within 
it, which may take some time to achieve. Pressured social workers will 
often seek the high grounds of certainty as a strategy for managing 
complex cases and exclude the opportunity to refl ect as they extricate 
themselves from the very problem they need to engage.
Uncertainty poses a threat. The threat of feeling insecure during the 
process of uncertainty forces the individual to remove themselves to a 
position where they feel safer in this situation they crave certainty. They 
seek clarifi cation and propositional knowledge (rules and procedures to 
follow). Individuals need to learn how to stay in a state of uncertainty 
and manage the threat for a period of time to allow for their enhanced 
narrative to emerge. This enables a different type of questioning and 
critical challenge that exposes the problem to a unique process of critical 
enquiry. It can never be a quick fi x although recognise some situations 
demand quicker solutions.
Conclusion
A dedicated research focus is required into defi ning refl ection. Is it 
something that potentially exists within all of us, a thing in itself, or 
something that a few of us can achieve subject to key factors in place?
There is limited evidence that students are more confi dent or 
knowledgeable about what is refl ection in either the limited literature 
search or empirical study undertaken for this article. However, one 
could deduce from academics excessive claims refl ection is something 
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known. Academics and professionals start from a position that refl ection 
exists and all we need to do is locate it.
We need to develop our confi dence about the parameters of refl ection 
and the building blocks that make it what it is. Not to do this is folly as 
Burns and Bulman claim ‘until we have greater clarity in the expected 
outcomes of refl ection, it will remain diffi cult to assess’ (2000: 71). 
Social workers are critical thinkers that rely on their interaction with 
a social and political world that is often forced into perplexity because 
of their own beliefs and values and their feelings on this. All of these 
facets are part of our reasoning and thinking and require scrutiny and 
understanding so we can defi ne better what refl ection is? This will 
enable a more ethical measure to assess refl ection when we see it. Until 
such time there is no such thing as refl ection.
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